Beyond the spectrum : understanding Czech Euroscepticism outside left-right classification by O'Dowd, Kathryn Quinn
DISCLAIMER:	  This	  document	  does	  not	  meet	  the current	  format	  guidelines	  of 
the Graduate	  School	  at	  	  The	  University	  of	  Texas	  at	  Austin.	  It	  has	  been	  published	  for	  informational	  use	  only.	  
Copyright 
by 
Kathryn Quinn O’Dowd 
2017 
The Thesis committee for Kathryn Quinn O’Dowd Certifies that this is the 
approved version of the following thesis: 
Beyond the Spectrum: Understanding Czech Euroscepticism Outside Left-
Right Classification 
APPROVED BY SUPERVISING COMMITTEE: 
______________________________________
Rachel Wellhausen, Supervisor      
__________________________________________ 
      Mary Neuburger                    
Beyond the Spectrum: Understanding Czech Euroscepticism Outside Left-
Right Classification 
By 
Kathryn Quinn O’Dowd, B.A. 
Thesis 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
Of the University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 
Master of Arts
The University of Texas at Austin 
May 2017
i 
Acknowledgements 
There are so many people who have aided in the thesis writing process. First, thank you to all of 
the professors that I have had over the years, whose courses have either directly or indirectly 
influenced the development of this work. The office staff at the Center for Russian, East 
European, and Eurasian Studies- especially Roy Flores, Jenica Jones, and Agnes Sekowski- have 
been an enormous support. Christian Hilchey, thank you for your Czech instruction over the last 
two years. Martin 1ČNRODthank you for your advice on how to conduct research in the Czech 
Republic, as well as connecting me with many of the researched parties. Mary Neuburger, thank 
you for reading my drafts and providing feedback throughout the process. Most importantly I 
need to thank my advisor Rachel Wellhausen, without whose guidance this project would have 
failed miserably. Finally to my family- Skipper, Pippin, Carrick, Kathy and Patrick O’Dowd, 
thank you for your years of support, it means the world to me.  
ii 
Beyond the Spectrum: Understanding Czech Euroscepticism Outside Left-
Right Classification 
by 
Kathryn Quinn O’Dowd, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
SUPERVISORS: Rachel Wellhausen 
         Commonly known as Euroscepticism, critical views of the European Union have grown 
significantly in the thirteen years since the Czech Republic joined the EU. Especially in light of 
the United Kingdom’s recent vote to leave the EU, it is imperative that we understand 
Euroscepticism across member-states. The Czech Republic is an important place to contextualize 
Euroscepticism due to its history as a post-communist state. Euroscepticism occurs both on the 
left and right ends of the political spectrum in the Czech Republic, as such there needs to be a 
more holistic picture of the factors that influence adoption of a Eurosceptic platform. This study 
looks at factors beyond a party’s position on the left-right spectrum—such as party age, level of 
education, and urban/rural divide—in an effort to better understand which parties in the Czech 
Republic are the most likely to develop Eurosceptic platforms. While rural and less educated 
citizens are more likely to be Eurosceptic, party elites tend to overrule popular opinions in the 
development of party platforms. Age of the party, however, has a strong correlation with a 
party’s likelihood of being Eurosceptic. Newer parties are more likely than older ones of 
adopting Eurosceptic platforms, thus presents strong evidence for the growing permanence of 
Euroscepticism within the Czech party system.  
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Euroscepticism and the Czech Republic 
On May 1st, 2004 the Czech Republic joined the European Union, making it one of the 
first post-communist states to do so. Since the end of communism in 1989, gaining EU 
membership was a major project of political elites (Baun et al. 2006; Riishoj 2007; Esparza 
2010). The public generally supported this push towards membership as joining the EU was seen 
as a critical step in erasing negative associations of communism. In the thirteen years since the 
Czech Republic joined the EU much has changed both domestically and internationally in terms 
of how the EU is perceived, as parties across the right- left spectrum have become more 
uncertain of the EU (Havlík 2011). In the Czech Republic, opponents of the EU have emerged in 
all levels of society. This phenomenon is best is exemplified by Former President Václav Klaus, 
who is an outspoken critic of the EU.  
In the Czech Republic, Euroscepticism is found across the political spectrum; far-left 
.6ý0, far-right Úsvit and more centrist leaders such as Klaus have all expressed Eurosceptic 
beliefs. As a result, this study will investigate other factors as they relate to a party’s Eurosceptic 
stance. Working from the following literature this research will examine which factors help 
predict a party’s likelihood of Euroscepticism.  The 2013 Presidential Election provides a critical 
case study, as it demonstrated both a clear rural/urban divide in party platforms as well as 
competition between two parties that had been founded less than five years prior to the election. 
This study hypothesizes that newer political parties, rural-based political parties, and parties with 
less educated bases are all more likely to be Eurosceptic. This project demonstrates that while 
rural and less educated voters are more likely to be Eurosceptic, this is not always reflected in 
party leadership. Newer parties, however, are more likely to be Eurosceptic as a whole. This 
study contributes to the existing literature on Euroscepticism by providing a more holistic 
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understanding of the development of Eurosceptic platforms in Czech political parties. The first 
section of this thesis will provide background and context for a study of Euroscepticism in the 
Czech Republic. Section two will discuss hypotheses in detail with supporting literature. Section 
three will provide evidence for these hypotheses; beginning with an analysis of voting programs, 
followed by interview data, and a case study of the 2013 presidential election. The final section 
provides conclusion and summary of the findings of this study. 
Background 
Theory 
Euroscepticism was developed by Paul Taggart as a way to explain growing debates 
about the legitimacy of the EU (1998). Broadly defined, Euroscepticism is a critical view of 
European integration. Over the past two decades Euroscepticism has grown, as the EU itself 
becomes increasingly politicized (Hooghe and Marks 2008; de Wilde and Zürn 2012). This 
politicization is a reaction to the growing authority of the EU (de Wilde and Zürn 2012). 
Euroscepticism first appeared in public discourse with the difficulties in passing the Maastricht 
Treaty in the early 1990s (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008). Prior to the 1990s, the EU was in a 
period of ‘permissive consensus,’ a time in which EU changes were made by-and-large without 
contestation. Scholars such as Usherwood and Startin look at the failure of the Maastricht Treaty 
as a particular tipping point in ensuring that Eurosceptic debates were present in public 
discussions moving forward. Trouble in passing the Maastricht Treaty “alerted publics to the fact 
that European integration was diluting national sovereignty,” prior to the treaty the public were 
generally not concerned with the implication of EU membership on their daily lives (Hooghe and 
Marks 2008, 21).  
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The Czech Republic joined the EU in 2004, more than ten years after the end of 
‘permissive consensus.’ Whereas during the period of ‘permissive consensus’ membership was 
assumed among member-states, the difficulties with the Maastricht Treaty as well as the 
incorporation of new member-states meant that citizens learned to think of the EU in more 
contentious, political terms. As the Czech Republic, because of its communist past, had to reform 
itself in order to be considered for membership, membership in the EU always had a political 
connotations in Czech society. This may help explain why in recent years the Czech Republic 
has been such a fruitful ground for Euroscepticism.  
Euroscepticism can be classified as either ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ (Taggart 1998; Taggart and 
Szczerbiak 2008). ‘Hard’ Euroscepticism refers to complete rejection of EU membership, 
whereas ‘Soft’ Eurosceptics support EU membership, but are critical of various aspects of 
integration. These categories developed as a response to the fact that the EU is criticized in a 
variety of ways with varying levels of intensity. The idea of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ can be problematic 
in that they oversimplify views on the EU; because platforms on the EU exist on a spectrum 
from fully rejecting the EU to completely supportive of its policies, describing Eurosceptic views 
as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ is a generalization of Euroscepticism.  
Parties often gain the label of ‘Eurosceptic’ for even the slightest criticism of the EU, 
Neumayer critiques the ways in which that parties have been defined as Eurosceptic as being 
overly inclusive and ignoring the historical transformations of political parties’ positions on the 
EU in post-communist states (2008). Neumayer explains that Euroscepticism has been used in 
post-communist states as both a means to include or exclude other parties, and as a means for 
mainstream parties to differentiate themselves. This is helpful in understanding the limitations of 
the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ definitions of Euroscepticism. Indeed they were developed in 1998, a full 
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six years before the Czech Republic (or any other post-communist state) would join the EU. In 
examining political parties’ understanding of the EU and applying Euroscepticism as a 
theoretical framework, it is important to take into account the time in which the theory was first 
developed. In his original work on Euroscepticism, Taggart claims that it is a fringe movement 
without any real place in government (1998).  Increasingly, however, across Europe Eurosceptic 
parties are being elected to government positions. Thus this study provides a more nuanced 
understanding of what makes a party Eurosceptic. 
Kopecky and Mudde critique these over simplistic categories by proposing a two-
dimensional system to better articulate party ideologies (2002). Of the four candidate states 
surveyed in their study (Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic), the Czech Republic 
was the most Eurosceptic overall, with both higher levels of public Euroscepticism and more 
representation of Eurosceptic parties. Usherwood and Startin also attempt to provide nuance to 
the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ categories by identifying four types of political parties when it comes to 
Euroscepticism; single-issue pro-sovereignty parties, radical right parties, non-traditional far-left 
parties (KSýM), and ‘soft Eurosceptic’ parties (2013).  These categories then provide an 
important foundation for this study; there are many types of Eurosceptic parties across the 
political spectrum, as such it should be investigated which factors these parties share. 
Furthermore, Usherwood and Startin argue that these ‘soft Eurosceptic’ parties are becoming 
increasingly embedded in European societies (2013). However, the identification of a party as 
‘soft’ Eurosceptic is tricky because it seems that any party could take issue with some aspect of 
the EU. This presents a problem in the division between academic definitions of Euroscepticism 
and the ways in which parties employ the term.  
Brief Overview of Modern Czech History 
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 In order to understand why EU membership is contested uniquely in the Czech Republic, 
it is important to highlight a few key points in Czech history. Historically the Czechs have been 
defined in relation for foreign rule (Riishøj 2007). Between 1620 and 1918 the Czech lands were 
under the control of the Hapsburg Monarchy. During this time German was the language of 
learning and government in the Czech lands (Anderson 1983). In reaction to German dominance, 
activists such as Josef Dobrovský and Josef Jungmann advocated revival the Czech language. 
Thus language was used as a means to distinguish Czech identity in relation to foreign rulers 
(Anderson 1983).  
 Between the two World Wars, the First Czechoslovak Republic was created under the 
leadership of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk. This period is mythologized even today in the Czech 
imagination as a time of freedom. During this time Czechoslovakia advanced into one of the 
most industrialized countries in the world (.UHMþtDQGMachonin 1998). This was not to last, as 
the Nazis occupied Bohemia and Moravia in 1939. The Soviets liberated Prague in 1945 and in 
1948 the communist coup made Czechoslovakia into a Soviet satellite state.   
 During the late 1960s in an effort to create ‘socialism with a human face,’ the 
Czechoslovak government relaxed restrictions on speech. As a result of these reforms 
Czechoslovakia was invaded by the USSR. Known as the Prague Spring, these events reinforced 
Czech solidarity in the face of oppression (Williams 1997). Although after invasion until the end 
of communism in 1989 Czechoslovakia faced harsh repercussions for their actions, this 
oppression emphasized the “symbolic power of the martyr in Czech constructs of identity” 
(Williams 1997, 190). In response to the reforms of the 1960s, the Soviets doubled down on 
restrictions on speech and expression. This period, known as normalization, is one in which 
writers and dissidents made use of the samizdat—independent, illegal underground publishing—
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to distribute their works. During the normalization of the 1970s the political writings of the 
future President of Czechoslovakia (and later Czech Republic), Václav Havel first rose to 
prominence. In his classic work Power of the Powerless, Havel advocates for a society that 
supports the freedom of the individual to live in their own truth, yet also expresses skepticism in 
the liberating powers of Western-style democracy (1979).  This optimism, however, is contrasted 
by a long history of collaboration—from those Czechs who collaborated with the Nazis during 
the Second World War to those who were complicit with the communist regime in order to 
survive (Bryant 2009). Indeed Chad Bryant’s study points to collaboration as a means by which 
Czechs were able to preserve their identity during the Nazi occupation (Bryant 2009). Just as 
there is a long tradition of resistance in the Czech consciousness, the history of collaboration 
may also lead to skepticism, such as that exemplified by figures like Klaus. 
 After the fall of communism in 1989, Czechoslovak (and after 1993, Czech) leaders 
pushed for entrance to the EU. In 1993, Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia occurred as a result of Czech and Slovak politicians 
differing views of future of their nation, as well as the uneven growth of the Czech and Slovak 
economies. While Czechs laud this so-called “Velvet Divorce” for its peaceful example of the 
states’ dissolution, it also served to move the Czechs further towards the West. The Czech state 
no longer shared a border with the former Soviet Union, thus placing it even more firmly into the 
Western tradition. In the wake of this, leaders like President Havel campaigned hard for EU 
membership (Riishøj 2007). The hope of this campaign was that through entry into the European 
community, the Czech Republic could rid itself of its communist past. Czech elites constructed 
Czech identity in light what they viewed as their historical place in Europe. The national history 
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of the Czech Republic was therefore viewed as one that was firmly situated in Western Europe 
(Riishøj 2007; Esparza 2010).  
The present situation in the Czech Republic in many ways reflects the past. While they 
are not directly under the rule of another power, many Czechs feel dominated by larger EU 
nations (Esparza 2010). This is especially true of Germany as the Czechs already have negative 
historical associations with Germanic peoples who dominate EU decision-making. Riishøj 
questions to what levels the identities of Czech and European can co-exist. Many Czechs see 
their national identity as having been defined from the outside; their first period of national 
‘awakening’ came during Hapsburg rule (2007). Criticisms of the EU bring up this historical 
threat of collaboration, these historical periods in which the Czech lands were under the rule of a 
foreign power and Czechs had to make concessions to survive. This is reflected in the many 
criticisms of the EU that depict the Czech Republic as the pawn of the West. Thus EU 
encroachment on domestic issues is seen by Czechs to reflect these times of foreign rule.  There 
is a feeling of lost sovereignty as a result of EU membership (Hooghe and Marks 2008). 
Euroscepticism symbolically reasserts lost autonomy.  By its very nature membership means that 
any member-state will have to give up certain aspects of self-governance in order to fully 
participate. Eurosceptics are able to tap into these nationalistic sentiments in order to gain 
support for their cause, whether or not the loss of sovereignty is real or imagined.  
As Eurosceptic debates gain prominence in the public spheres, it is important to 
remember the issues of national identity that Eurosceptic actors tap into. Greater policy input on 
the European level implies a greater loss of sovereignty on a national level, thus such dissent 
should be expected as the EU becomes more integrated. This long history of foreign rule 
undoubtedly contributes to constructions of Europe in the Czech Republic and shapes the way 
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that they perceive other member states.  As a smaller state, Czech citizens may feel that they are 
less influential in EU decision-making (Magnette and Nicolaidis 2004). The associations with 
EU membership may be different for post-communist states as opposed to Western European 
states (Tucker et al., 2002).  
EU Power 
The enlargement of the EU likely contributes to the growth of Euroscepticism. In 2004, 
the Czech Republic (along with Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia) was added to the EU in its largest single expansion. Such an expansive 
enlargement inherently changes the make-up of the EU, incorporating different states that may 
have an entirely different idea of what it means to be part of the European community. 
Furthermore, eight of these new member states (including the Czech Republic) were former 
members of the Eastern Bloc.  
 Many post-communist states spent much of the 1990s and early 2000s working towards 
EU membership. EU membership was seen as beneficial not only in terms of politics, but also 
because it was a way for post-communist states to repair their image (Bardi et al. 2002). This 
demonstrates how membership, even from the beginning, was seen differently in Central and 
Eastern Europe. In contrast to earlier member states that saw EU membership as a matter-of-
course due to their geography, association with the EU had major political implications for states 
that were trying to reform their image after the fall of communism.  
 In the Czech Republic this campaign for EU membership was known as a ‘return to 
Europe’ (Esparza 2010). This so-called ‘return to Europe’ demonstrates the political dimension 
of being European for post-communist states. Through the legitimizing nature of EU 
membership, the Czech Republic could ensure its place in democratic Europe. Since EU 
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membership had a significant symbolic meaning for Czechs, in the campaign for membership, 
the optics were often more important than the actual implications of EU membership. Czech 
voters were not heavily influenced by the campaign for EU membership; they were, rather, cued 
by established positive associations with ‘Europe.’ Anti-communism was used to frame a ‘yes’ 
vote for entry into the EU. The campaign for membership included both low levels of public 
knowledge and high levels of elite contention as to the benefits of membership (Hanley 2004).  
However, Hanely notes that these were still debates “around” rather than “about” membership, 
as even Klaus, a known critic of the EU, failed to formerly oppose or support membership 
(2004). The lack to substantive debates as to whether or not the Czech Republic should actually 
join the EU likely contributed to low levels of public knowledge. Indeed the campaign was 
simply called Ano, yes in Czech, basically telling voters to vote yes to Europe. Hanley concludes 
that the most likely reason why the Ano campaign was successful was not because of the 
effective campaign or the public’s knowledge of the positive effects of EU membership, but 
rather because of positive imagery of Western Europe and the belief that joining the EU would 
allow the Czech Republic to become part of Western Europe (2004).  
 In the wake of the fall of communism it was difficult for political strategists to mobilize 
constituencies, because they had long been suppressed, this lack of formalized groups contributes 
to weak party institutionalization in Central and Eastern Europe (Innes 2002).  The Czech 
Republic (as well as Slovakia) attempted to use the transition from communism to capitalism to 
create political identities (Innes 2002). Partially due to weak party stability in Central and 
Eastern Europe, voters in the referendum were cued more by individual political actors rather 
than by parties. One advantage of this is that political parties in post-communist states often do 
not carry the same baggage as similar parties in Western Europe due to their newness. Because 
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parties in post-communist states do not have core constituencies, they are not held to the same 
level of accountability that Western European states hold their party members (Innes 2002). 
 Others such as Lyons, and Tverdova and Anderson have asserted that it was in fact the 
economy that was a major motivator for voters in choosing EU membership. In Lyons’ study of 
voter opinions of EU entry, economics are shown to have a larger pull on Czech voters than 
party ideologies. Lyons contrasts this with Western European states where party loyalties are 
stronger. The study concludes that moving forward into membership economic factors will 
continue to play a strong role in determining public support for the EU (Lyons 2007). Tverdova 
and Anderson also assert that people do not vote for membership simply based on support for the 
West, but rather and mixture of economic and practical concerns (2004). While they find that 
economics were more powerful than parties in determining voter support for EU entry, parties 
played an important role in providing the public information on the benefits of EU membership 
(Tverdova and Anderson 2004). Lyons makes this an either-or-issue, when, in fact, the economy 
and the positive image of ‘Europe’ are connected. As Tverdova and Anderson demonstrate, 
economic and party-based decisions are not separate from each other. People voted based on the 
fact they believed that joining the EU would bolster their economy, but also because the positive 
imagery that membership presented.  
There are many factors that may influence the growth of Euroscepticism, but one of the 
most significant is the expansion of the EU’s authority into domestic matters. Critics have said 
that there is a ‘democratic deficit’ in the governing of the EU, however, Moravcsik is critical of 
this evaluation of the EU (2002). Moravcsik assesses what people call the ‘democratic deficit’ in 
the European Union. Because the EU does not have the enforcing powers to ensure that all of 
their policies are enacted, much of the actual policy enforcement is left to domestic governments. 
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Technological advances have also served to create the illusion that the EU is expanding 
exponentially. Because of the access the new technology provides, people feel closer to the EU 
than ever before, thus they feel as if it is playing a larger role in daily life, even if this is not the 
case.  
Euroscepticism and the Public  
Another factor contributing to debate about the EU is the public’s involvement. Early 
efforts to create a European project in the 1950s occurred, by-and-large without strong public 
engagement, but since 1992 the public have become much more invested in EU policy (Fuchs et 
al. 2009). As a result of growing public concern referendums are increasingly used in deciding 
whether or not to implement EU policy. Although in theory these referendums should assuage 
public concerns about the elite control of the EU, it has shown to further Eurosceptic viewpoints 
(Usherwood and Startin 2013). Referendums more acutely cue the public into the actions of the 
EU. Whereas the EU previously existed only in the background of daily life, referendums serve 
as a reminder of the impact of the EU on daily life. Additionally the public has grown more 
Eurosceptic and new technologies, make it harder to ignore them (Hooghe and Marks, 2008). 
Average citizens, through access to the Internet and social media, are able to express their beliefs 
on a large-scale, thus amplifying their voice. According to the November 2016 Eurobarometer 
poll, when asked “In general, does the European union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly 
positive, neutral, fairly negative, or very negative image?” 26% of those surveyed maintained 
‘fairly positive’ image of the EU, compared with 23% who held a ‘fairly negative’ view, 39% 
had a ‘neutral view’, 9% of those surveyed had ‘very negative,’ while only 2% of those surveyed 
had ‘very positive’. This is consistent with the same poll conducted in November 2015, but a 
large departure from November 2014 where 34% of those surveyed had ‘fairly positive image,’ 
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and only 17% had ‘fairly negative.’ This spike in negative views after November 2014 may be 
tied with large EU-wide issues such as the handling of the Syrian refugee situation and how it 
was perceived in the Czech Republic. This, coupled with the growing number of successful 
Eurosceptic candidates, means that Euroscepticism has a stronger foothold in Czech society than 
ever before. As there is a greater capacity for communication between elites and the public 
through the internet, the public has a greater platform from which to express discontent. 
Furthermore these polls demonstrate the dividedness of views on the EU in the Czech Republic. 
It not just that people have grown more critical of the EU, but they have developed stronger 
opinions on all sides about the EU (Usherwood and Starton 2013). These divided views makes 
space for parties across the political spectrum to adopt both strong pro-European or Eurosceptic 
views.  
There is debate as to whether Euroscepticism is a top-down or a bottom-up phenomenon. 
Previous studies have found that while people are often active in stating their disdain for the EU, 
they still tend to elect non-Eurosceptic parties (Spanje and Vreese 2011). However, the successes 
of more skeptical politicians such as Presidents Klaus and Zeman suggest otherwise in the Czech 
context. While people express negative opinions about the EU, they are typically ill informed as 
to its functions. Lack of familiarity with the EU’s processes coupled with increasing visibility of 
the EU appear to be a bad combination for positive public perception of the EU.  
 Euroscepticism may be more common among citizens because there are no widely 
consumed pan-European news sources, all information that the public consumes concerning EU 
issues are inherently filtered through nationalistic lenses (Daddow 2006). This trend is 
interesting in light of the increasingly integrated media landscape. Fewer and fewer international 
groups now own more and more news sources. In the Czech Republic, international companies 
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own many of the major media outlets. The most widely read daily in the Czech Republic is 
Blesk, a tabloid which often focuses on the lives and scandals of the famous (Trampota 2017). 
There is distance between citizens and Brussels, so citizens must depend on a source such as the 
news for goings on in the EU. Furthermore Daddow discusses the fact that because there is no 
widely accepted definition on Euroscepticism in practice. It seems as if the accepted terminology 
in academia to describe Euroscepticism is not necessarily the same Euroscepticism that political 
actors are referring to. Again this demonstrates the problematic nature of defining 
Euroscepticism.  
Research Proposal and Hypotheses  
As the previous literature has demonstrated, Euroscepticism is on the rise both in the 
Czech Republic and Europe as a whole. Inspired by this situation, this research seeks to uncover 
which factors make political parties most likely to adopt Eurosceptic platforms in the Czech 
context. Furthermore, as explained in the previous section, the public have become more 
involved in Eurosceptic debates, thus this study hypothesizes that the demographic make-up of a 
party will have a strong relationship with that party’s likelihood of being Eurosceptic. Parties 
with constituencies that have demonstrated a greater frequency of Euroscepticism should be 
overall more Eurosceptic than parties made-up of members who are typically more pro-
European.  
Historically, voters in post-communist states have a positive perception of the EU, largely 
due to its perceived economic benefits. Although people in post-communist states have positive 
associations with the EU, there is still lower voter participation. Pop-Eleches and Tucker 
examine what may be contributing to low voter turn out in post-communist states (2012). They 
conclude that lower civic participation is limited to those who lived through communism, and 
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purport that lower levels of participation will remain with those generations. The legacy of 
communism on voters is also explained by Pop-Eleches and Tucker in a 2011 study, which found 
that exposure to communist regimes results in less enthusiasm for democratic and economic 
reforms. In light of this combination of weak party institutionalization, low civic participation, 
and strong Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic, the political party is an important place to 
study the growth of Euroscepticism.  
As Euroscepticism is found both on the left and right ends of the political spectrum, this 
study seeks to uncover other factors that help indicate a party’s likelihood to adopt Eurosceptic 
platforms. Historically Euroscepticism is found in parties on both the far-right and far-left ends 
of the ideological spectrum. Although Conti finds a more longstanding tradition of the far-right 
and Euroscepticism, in the Czech Republic the far-left has a much longer history of 
Euroscepticism. In the 2003 campaign for EU membership, only the Communist Party (.6ý0 
opposed membership to the EU.  The main purpose of this study is to demonstrate how factors, 
beyond a party’s position on the left-right spectrum, need to be looked at in order to form a 
clearer picture as to which kinds of parties are the most likely to be Eurosceptic. As a result of 
the presence of Euroscepticism across the spectrum, other factors that may influence the 
adoption of Eurosceptic platforms need to be taken into consideration:  
 
H1: Newer political parties are more likely to develop Eurosceptic platforms. 
Because the Czech Republic has low levels of party permanence, new parties are more 
successful than in Western European states. While, a large number of EU citizens are critical of 
the EU, in recent years citizens have become more active in voicing their opinions on EU issues 
and newer political parties without established platforms are able to capitalize on this. Overall 
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established, mainstream parties tend to be more pro-EU, while parties on the margins are more 
likely to express Eurosceptic voices (Spanje and Vreese 2011). As has been stated, however, 
Euroscepticism plays an increasingly central role in Czech politics. One explanation for this is 
the emergence of successful new Eurosceptic parties.  
Although there is overall weak party institutionalization in Central and Eastern Europe, 
some parties are able to maintain longevity. In the Czech Republic, three parties, the Communist 
3DUW\.6ý0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Party (ODS), do have stronger attachments (Vlachova 2001). Vlachova speculates that this may 
lead to a more stabilized party competition in the future. This article does not speak well to the 
strength of new parties that we are currently seeing in the Czech Republic. With only a few 
parties well established in the system, there is space for new parties. The growing popularity of 
Euroscepticism is further facilitated by new Eurosceptic parties.  
 There is weak party institutionalization overall in Central and Eastern Europe, largely due 
to communist one-party rule for the majority of the 20th century. One result of this weak 
institutionalization is that party extinction is much more likely. Thus parties need to appeal more 
strongly to voters, as voters do not have as strong of historical ties to their parties as they may 
have in other parts of Europe. Also this means that party ideologies are not as static. Resulting 
from this, incumbents are much less likely to be reelected in post-communist states than their 
western counterparts (Bernhard and Karakoc 2011). This greater risk of extinction or getting 
voted out of office means that parties and political actors in these states need a salient issue in 
order to gain support.  
When it comes time to make electoral decisions, most voters do not make their decisions 
based on all of the political parties on the ballot, but rather narrow it to a smaller group of parties 
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based on their preferences (Mateju and Vlachova 1998). A Left-wing socio-economic value does 
not inevitably result in support for the left-wing party. This demonstrates the need for both 
powerful messaging and strong political figures in order to attract voters in Central and Eastern 
Europe. If ideology is not always the determinant of voter behavior, then the party must be 
persuasive in other ways in order to ensure a vote. Newer political parties may be easier able to 
capitalize on the lack of party stability through persuasive Eurosceptic platforms.  
Parties in Central and Eastern Europe were by-and large oriented positively towards the 
EU prior to membership, however in the past ten years, that orientation has not been as uniform. 
Prior to EU entry, there was by-and-large consensus among most political parties as to the 
benefits of EU membership, excepting Communist Party, which was a major political outsider at 
the time. There is no longer consensus; the EU is a means by which parties can distinguish 
themselves. A party’s participation in the government, however, has a positive effect on that 
party’s position on European integration, as such newer parties that have less experience working 
with government may be more likely to be Eurosceptic (Havlik 2011).  
The growth of the EU has altered the way that parties orient themselves around EU 
issues, as parties have become increasingly concerned with European matters. This also ends up 
affecting the parties’ domestic platforms as well as they are now more concerned with how the 
EU affects national policy (Baun et al.  2006). The extent to which political parties are 
‘Europeanized,’ or supportive of the EU, is related to how deeply that party is working in the 
government (Havlik and Vykoupilova 2008). Parties who are strongly represented in government 
are more likely to present positive views of the EU. Parties without an established history use the 
issue of European integration to establish themselves. Thus it would make sense that parties that 
have existed in the system over time have developed a more positive attitude towards the EU.  
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H2: Political parties with rural bases are more likely to develop Eurosceptic platforms. 
Because those living in larger population centers are typically closer to government, both 
physically and relationally, they are more likely to have direct interactions with government 
officials and institutions. In light of this urbanites are more likely to develop more positive 
associations with government institutions. Resulting from this distance, political parties with 
more rural bases are likelier than urban parties to develop Eurosceptic platforms. Surwillo et al.’s 
study of Eurosceptic attitudes in Poland found that those most likely to be Eurosceptic were 
living in rural communities (2010). The Czech Republic is comparable in many ways to Poland- 
similar histories in the 20th century, culminating with both joining the EU in 2004. As such, this 
finding likely holds true for the Czech Republic as well.  
Although the public has become more vocal in voicing their opinions on European issues, 
the EU remains, by and large, an elite project. While the public is more connected with what is 
going in in Brussels through social media and other technologies, this does not always translate 
into greater influence in EU decision-making. The public is proverbially included more in the 
decision-making processes via the implementation of referendums, but the EU by-and-large 
remains controlled by the few in office. Political actors who have less influence in the affairs of 
the state are more likely to express views critical of the EU and thus are able to connect with 
rural Eurosceptic populations. The distance, both physical and personal, of those living in rural 
environments. This study hypothesizes that the general rural preference for Euroscepticism will 
be reflected in Eurosceptic party membership.  
 
H3: Political parties with less educated constituencies are more likely to develop Eurosceptic      
       platforms.  
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It has been well observed that those with lower levels of education are more skeptical of 
the EU (Hakhverdian et al. 2013); this study purports that this is true on the party level as well. 
Parties that are made up of less educated individuals are more likely to have platforms critical of 
the EU, reflective of the general educational divide in views of the EU. The demographics of 
who in the citizenry are likely to oppose the EU may have changed since the Czech Republic 
became a member state (Tucker et al. 2002). Tucker et al. found that more educated people were 
more likely to oppose EU membership or abstain from voting in the EU referendum. This study 
hypothesizes that these findings are not consistent with the current landscape of who in the 
population opposes membership. Tucker’s study was conducted before membership and those 
that opposed membership were already quite a small group within general population. 
Hakverdain et al.’s study suggests that less educated people are more influenced by campaigns 
from political parties and as every major party (except the communists) supported membership, 
it would make sense that membership was widely supported across all levels of education 
(2013).  
Hakverdain et al. argue that less educated people are more likely to take their voting cues 
from political parties, but that Eurosceptic parties are most often found on the fringes (2013) In 
the Czech Republic, however, Eurosceptic parties are competitive in elections, as has been 
demonstrated with the successes of parties such as SPO and ODS. While the in the Czech 
Republic there is almost universal access to secondary education, mobility in terms of tertiary 
education in the Czech Republic were the lowest of the countries surveyed in the 2012 OECD 
poll. Thus the majority of Czechs surveyed (66%) attain the same level of education as their 
parents, while only 21% attain a higher level of education. Dissatisfaction with lack of social 
mobility may contribute to a feeling of skepticism with the government as a whole.  
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There is some correlation between rural populations and access to higher education, due 
to the fact that most Czech universities are located in larger cities (Franta and Guzi 2008).  
Franta and Guzi found that those living in closer proximity to a university have a greater chance 
of achieving higher education (2008). While there is some correlation, education and rural/urban 
divide will be treated by this project as two distinct categories. More demographic information 
would be needed in order to deal with populations that have both of these characteristics and the 
frequency of their combination. Further research may delve more into the nuanced picture of 
voters who may be less educated and rural, or less educated and urban, however, for the purposes 
of this study these two categories will be treated as distinct.  
Alternative Hypothesis:  
AH1: Political parties may be generating fears about the EU in order to gain membership/votes. 
This study focuses largely on the impact that membership has on a party’s platforms, 
however, this alternative hypothesis suggests that Euroscepticism is engineered more from the 
top. Another explanation for why parties are adopting Eurosceptic platforms is that they are 
fanning the flames of fears held by citizens. Because of the post-communist context of states 
such as the Czech Republic, there is a great distrust that goes in to electoral decision-making 
(Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011). This could be why countries such as the Czech Republic have a 
reputation for Euroscepticism. Former communist states with more democratic liberties were 
more likely to express distrust in political parties, than those with fewer democratic liberties 
(Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011). Political parties may be capitalizing, and even encouraging, this 
distrust.  
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Methods 
This project was accomplished both through interviews with party workers and analysis 
of voting programs. Interviews with party-workers took place both in-person in Prague and via 
Skype. All interviews were conducted in August 2016. Parties were selected from the top ten 
performing parties from the 2014 European Parliamentary Elections. The Party of Civic Rights 
(SPO), although not one of the top ten performing parties, was also chosen, as it is the party of 
current President Miloš Zeman. Participants were contacted through emails found on party 
websites and through contacts already known by the researcher. Interviews were conducted with 
representatives from Úsvit, TOP 09, KDU-ý6/DQGWKH*UHHQ3DUW\These parties represent 
Eurosceptic and pro-European platforms, as well as representation from both old and new 
parties. Although not every party studied in this project was interviewed, these parties are 
important in painting a more nuanced picture of the influence that constituents have on the 
development of Eurosceptic platforms. The diversity of this sample is important demonstrating 
how parties interact with constituents across the spectrum.  
The target population of this research was non-elected party workers, as they can speak 
well to the development of policy. Participants were asked a series of open-ended interview 
questions. Topics covered during the interviews include questions about party make-up, party 
platforms, the European Union, and Euroscepticism. The goal of this being both to shape the 
conversation, but allow for natural connections that the interviewee’s minds about the European 
Union and Euroscepticism. Interviews were conducted in English, so all interviewees were 
fluent, but not native, English speakers.  This qualitative approach seeks to better understand the 
motivations behind why and how parties engage with increasingly Eurosceptic populations. 
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Furthermore, as a connector between Brussels and constituents, it is critical to conduct 
interviews on the party level.  
 In order to supplement information obtained through interviews, information was also 
collected from each party’s website, with particular attention paid to the most recent voting 
program section on the party’s stance towards the European Union. Party materials also include 
information found through the Manifesto Project, an online database of party manifestos. The 
search of manifestos was narrowed to Czech parties since 2004 (the year of accession) and 
searched for all documents mentioning the EU (Evropská unie).  
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1 Information obtained from party websites 
2 Havlík and Voda 2016 
3 Povolný 2014 
4 Information obtained from interviews  
5 Mareš and Pšeja 2007 
 
6 Tavits 2013 
Name Eurosceptic  Year Founded Ideology Demographics Education 
 
ANO ‘soft’ Eurosceptic—
opposes further 
European 
integration (6) 
20121 Center-right; 
Populism (6) 
Urban/Bohemia2 High school3 
TOP 09 No; pro-European 
with the 
understanding that 
there can be reform 
within structure of 
EU (3) 
20091 Center-right (6) Urban/ Bohemia4 University, highly 
educated3 
Czech Social 
Democratic Party 
ý66' 
No; pro-European 
integration, 
including entry into 
the Eurozone (2) 
18781 Center-left (5)  Rural5 High school3  
Communist Party 
of Bohemia and 
0RUDYLD.6ý0 
Yes; historically 
opposed EU entry in 
2004, but lately 
have not loudly 
advocated for 
withdrawal from the 
EU like other 
parties (9) 
19891 Far-left (1) Suburban/Rural6  High school 
education3 
Christian and No; pro-European 19191 Center-right (6) Rural4 University; highly 
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7 Burkart 2014 
Democratic Union- 
Czechoslovak 
People’s Party 
(KDU-ý6/ 
with the 
understanding that 
there can be reform 
within structure of 
EU (3) 
educated3 
Civic Democratic 
Party (ODS) 
Slightly; believes 
that relationship 
needs to be 
questioned, but 
opposed further 
Eastern influence 
(7) 
19911 Center-right (5) Suburban26 University; highly 
educated3 
Party of Free 
Citizens 
(Svobodní) 
Yes; Believe that 
there are 
alternatives to 
citizenship, look to 
examples of 
Switzerland and 
Norway (10) 
20091 Far-right (10) Urban/Suburban4  N/A 
Czech Pirate Party 
(Piráti) 
Slightly; support the 
Czech Republic’s 
involvement with 
the EU for some 
issues, but support 
reassigning others 
back to national and 
local levels (6) 
20091 Center (5.5) Urban/ Suburban17  N/A 
Green Party (SZ) No; pro-European 
with the 
understanding that 
there can be reform 
19891 Center-Left, more 
right-leaning than 
other European 
Greens on security 
Urban4 University; highly 
educated34 
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Table 1 
 
                                                        
8 Kaniok 2014 
within structure of 
EU (2) 
issues (4) 
Dawn of Direct 
Democracy (Úsvit) 
Yes; supports a full 
withdrawal from the 
EU (10) 
20131 Far-right (10) Urban/ Suburban4 N/A 
Party of Civic 
Rights (SPO) 
Yes (8.5) 20091 Center-left (4) Rural8 N/A 
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Euroscepticism and the Left-Right Spectrum
Figure 2: All circled points represent parties interviewed; SZ, TOP 09, KDU-ý6/DQGÚsvit. All parties in the shaded area 
have some level of Eurosceptic platform.  
Figure 1 
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Evidence 
 
The proceeding table and graphics serve as a guide to the evidence presented below; 
parties on the chart are listed in order of the percentage of the vote that they received in the 2014 
European Parliament election. All parties, except for SPO, were selected because they were the 
top ten performing parties in the 2014 election. SPO was chosen because it is the party of the 
current Czech President, Miloš Zeman. The table was compiled with information obtained 
through interviews, analysis of party platforms, and existing demographic research. Based on 
this information it was determined whether or not a party was Eurosceptic as well as where that 
party fell on the left-right spectrum. Each party was assigned a number value from 1 (pro-
European) to 10 (Eurosceptic), as well as 1 (far- left) to 10 (far-right) this data was then used to 
create the graph labeled “Euroscepticism and the Left-Right Spectrum.” Rankings were 
determined after reading existing literature, conducting interviews, and reading party platforms. 
Numbers were subjectively assigned by the researcher in order to represent how the left-right 
spectrum and Euroscepticism interact. Parties with more extreme platforms on either issue were 
given either a higher or lower score, corresponding with their party policy. Every party 
represented in the shaded area of the graph possesses some level of Eurosceptic platform, 
demonstrating the presence of Euroscepticism across the political spectrum.  
 
Party Materials  
Ano 
Ano supports the EU in their 2013 manifesto, claiming that the EU, along with NATO 
and the UN are the best partners for the Czech Republic’s interests (Evropská unie, NATO, OSN 
MVRXQHMYKRGQČMãtPSDUWQHUHPSURSURVD]RYiQtQDãLFK]iMPĤ). However, Ano is also opposed to 
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further integration. Ano is a newer party; as such their ‘soft’ Eurosceptic stance supports the 
hypothesis that newer parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic. While they do not support a full 
withdrawal from the EU like some of the more ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties, they are opposed to 
further European integration. They are also a party with lower levels of education, which 
supports the hypothesis that parties with lower levels of education are typically Eurosceptic. 
Although not a hardline Eurosceptic party it should be noted that Ano, which considers 
itself to be more of a movement than a formal party, was founded by Andrej Babiš in 2009 to 
challenge the existing government. Ano (which is the Czech word for yes) also serves as an 
acronym for Action of Dissatisfied Citizens ($NFHQHVSRNRMHQêFKREþDQĤ).  
TOP 09 
 TOP 09’s 2013 voting program expresses that criticism of the EU is healthy for 
membership and that it should not be equated with a desire to leave. This effort in the first 
paragraph of the international politics section of their voting program suggests the importance of 
the issue and the desire to be clear about where they stand on the issue of Euroscepticism. This is 
supported by the interview with a worker from TOP 09, who stated that telling voters that you 
are Euro-optimist is like telling voters not to vote for you. TOP 09’s pro-European platforms 
confront the hypothesis that newer parties are more likely to develop Eurosceptics stances, 
however, it must also be considered that TOP 09 was formed by Miroslav Kalusek (who broke 
off from KDU–ý6/) and Karel Schwarzenberg. Thus although TOP 09 technically fits into the 
mode of a new party (having been established in 2009) it has much deeper ties to older parties 
than other parties that were founded in a similar time period. It is then, not surprising that 
although they are a new party, they maintain a pro-European platform.  
ý66' 
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 ý66'¶VPDQLIHVWRGLVFXVVHVWKHUROHRIWKH(8LQSURWHFWLQJWKHFLWL]HQVDQG
ensuring a higher quality of life. According to the 2010 manifesto, a strong Europe and a strong 
Czech Republic are synonymous (6LOQi(YURSVNiXQLH]QDPHQiVLOQRXýHVNRXUHSXEOLNXDVLOQi
SURVSHUXMtFtý5SRVLOXMH(YURSVNRXXQLL). This assertion is especially interesting in light of the 
literature that purports EU membership implies a loss (at least on some level) of sovereignty. In 
2006, at least according to members of ý66', this loss of sovereignty was beneficial for the 
Czech Republic.  
ý66'’s 2013 election program emphasizes that the problems of Europe need to be 
solved with the other EU member-states. Most interestingly the voting program has a sentence in 
bold, which tells voters that the current crisis is not a sign of the end of the European project, but 
rather a challenge to get back to the roots of the European Community (Evropský projekt nejen 
åHVHQHY\þHUSDODOHVRXþDVQiNUL]HMHQDRSDNYê]YRXYUiWLWVH]SČWNHNRĜHQĤP.) As an older 
party, this is not surprising that ý66' would have such strong pro-European stances. However, 
looking at the other hypotheses, ý66' is both rural and less educated. In light of these two 
demographic features it is surprising that ý66' is pro-European. Age of the party appears to be 
a more important factor in determining a party’s likelihood to be Eurosceptic as it relates most 
directly with that party’s exposure to the system and how much they have worked within that 
system (the obvious outlier is .6ý0).  
.6ý0 
 .6ý0’s 2013 voting program expresses a feeling of unequal footing with the other EU 
member-states. Furthermore they say that they reject the democratic deficit that they perceive is 
currently happening in the EU (&tOHYČGRPČRGPtWDWUR]ViKORXE\URNUDWL]DFLDSĜHWUYiYDMtFt
deficit demokraciev politickém rozhodování EU a odstranit je.) Use of this type of language to 
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discuss the Czech Republic’s place in the EU is unsurprising considering .6ý0 was the only 
mainstream party to oppose membership in 2004, one of the principal reasons for doing so being 
a fear of a loss of sovereignty.  
 Although .6ý0 represents an exception in that they are an older party who is 
Eurosceptic, this is not shocking when the party’s history is taken into account. As the legacy 
party of the Communist Party that was once in power during the Communist Era, .6ý0 is 
(along with Moldova’s Communist Party) one of the only former Communist Parties that has 
retained Communist as part of its title. The retention of ties to the old regime ensured that .6ý0 
were political outsiders in the 1990s and early 2000s as new leaders sought to reform the image 
of the Czech Republic and relinquish its ties to communism. The hypothesis that newer political 
parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic is formed on the supposition that newer parties are more 
disconnected with government and lack familiarity with the EU. Because .6ý0 has been 
political a outsider since the fall of communism, it is not surprising that even though they are not 
a new party they are Eurosceptic. .6ý0’s position as a less educated and more suburban party 
also fits in with the hypotheses of parties that are most likely to be Eurosceptic.  
KDU-ý6/ 
  In their 2013 voting program KDU-ý6/ is similarly pro-European, advocating for an 
expansion of the EU and further integration. Most interestingly the front page of the voting 
program says “Do you want to be like Germany? Vote like Germans!” (Chcete se mít jako 
v 1ČPHFNX"9ROWHMDNRY 1ČPHFNX). Especially as it is placed in such a prominent place in the 
voting program this language is striking.  
 Use of this language is interesting in light of the fact that KDU-ý6/ is a rural based 
party. Although KDU-ý6/ is a pro-European party, the party worker interviewed stated that they 
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often encounter pushback from members who are more Eurosceptic. Language like this is used 
to highlight the positive aspects of life in Europe. As a bordering state, Czechs often look to 
Germany as a standard (for jobs, lifestyle, quality of goods). Many of the Eurosceptic parties use 
language of recapturing national identity in order to have a better quality of life in the Czech 
Republic, however, KDU-ý6/ takes a different approach appealing to Czechs to vote for their 
party because they are also popular in Germany (Angela Merkel’s party). Use of this language is 
also striking when considering Czech’s history and what Rishoj describes as their creation of 
identity in opposition to a foreign ‘other.’ In their voting program KDU-ý6/ is taking the 
opposite approach by embracing ties with Germany. By highlighting positive aspects of 
European life, KDU-ý6/ may be attempting to assuage rural voters as to the benefits of voting 
for a pro-European party.  
ODS 
In their approach to the European Union, ODS describes themselves as realists. They 
explain that they wish to remain in the EU, but that does not mean that they will blindly accept 
everything from Brussels. ODS says that all legislation from Brussels will have to be analyzed 
with ‘Czech eyes’ (.DåGêSUYHNHYURSVNpLQWHJUDFHEXGHPHSRPČĜRYDWþHVNêPDRþLPD). This 
demonstrates the nationalistic nature of Eurosceptic language. The assertion that EU issues will 
be analyzed from the Czech perspective serves to assert Czech autonomy. 
 Although ODS is neither new (founded in 1991), rural, nor less educated ODS maintains 
a ‘soft’ Eurosceptic stance. This can be largely attributed to the influence of Former President 
Klaus who was one of the first major figures to brand himself as a ‘Euro-realist.’ Although this 
seems to confront the hypotheses, it is important to remember that as a party, ODS does not 
recommend a full withdrawal from the EU. This ‘soft’ Eurosceptic platform (as opposed to those 
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of Úsvit and Svobodní who call for a full withdrawal) is then perhaps more understandable in 
light of the hypotheses.  
Svobodní 
 Svobodní’s 2013 voting program moves beyond the language of ‘democratic deficit’ and 
rather refers to the actions of the EU as ‘undemocratic conditions’ (QHGHPRNUDWLFNpSRPČU\
They continue that rather than foster European ideals of freedom, democracy, and human 
decency, Svobodní declares that the EU destroys these values. According to Svobodní, the EU 
goes against common sense and the interest of the citizens it is supposed to serve. Ultimately 
Svobodní’s voting program places them firmly in the hard-Eurosceptic platform as they support 
a full withdrawal from the EU (Proto Svobodní navrhují hlasování o vystoupení z Evropské unie 
a jednozQDþQČGRSRUXþXMtDE\ýHVNiUHSXEOLND](8Y\VWRXSLOD). As a newer party, Svobodní’s 
hardline Eurosceptic stance is in line with the hypothesis about newer political parties being 
more likely to adopt Eurosceptic platforms. However, their urban/suburban base confronts the 
hypothesis that rural parties are the most likely to be Eurosceptic. This may point again to the 
idea that out of the three hypotheses age of the party is the strongest predictor for 
Euroscepticism.  
Piráti 
 In their platforms regarding the 2018 presidential election, Piráti recommend that the 
President support EU membership. Furthermore they want the future president to coordinate 
their international politics with other EU member-states. Ultimately Piráti want a president who 
will be simultaneously integral and critical of the EU (EXGHNULWLFNRXDOHSHYQRXVRXþiVWt
Evropské unie). This assertion reflects what was vocalized by members of both SZ and TOP 09, 
that there is no room for critiquing the EU and being considered Eurosceptic. By the parameters 
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of this study, Piráti would be considered ‘soft’ Eurosceptic due to the nature of their critiques; 
however, this calls into question the utility of such a label if views on the EU are not binary. As a 
newer party, again, Piráti supports the hypothesis that new parties are the most likely to support 
Eurosceptic platforms. However, as an urban/suburban party Piráti pushes against the hypothesis 
that rural parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic.  
SZ 
 SZ’s 2006 manifesto emphasizes that the EU is primarily a peace project (Evropská unie 
MHKLVWRULFN\MHGLQHþQêSURMHNW]DORåHQêQDP\ãOHQFHWUYDOpKRPtUX(the worker that I spoke with 
emphasized that SZ has not had any significant changes in their EU policy since accession). SZ’s 
2013 voting program is similarly optimistic about the role of the EU in Czech life. As with the 
2006 manifesto, the language of SZ’s voting program emphasized the EU’s role as a peace 
project and platform for the advancement of human rights. In contrast to other parties like ODS 
which have a more restrained support for the EU, SZ says that they seek further integration with 
the EU (usilujeme o další politickou integraci Evropské unie). As a well-established (founded in 
Czechoslovakia in 1989), urban, and well-educated party, SZ’s pro-European platforms support 
all three hypotheses as to which parties are most likely to be Eurosceptic.  
Úsvit 
 The language that Úsvit uses to oppose the EU in their party’s program is mostly focused 
around financial issues. They state that they are against any kind of taxation from the EU and 
they oppose bailing out any member-states that are failing financially. Although Úsvit says that 
they support alliances between states, they oppose the idea that the Czech Republic has to orient 
their interests around a superpower—regardless of if its Moscow, Berlin or Brussels (Jsme proti 
ÄRULHQWDFL³]DKUDQLþQtSROLWLN\QDNWHURXNROLYHOPRFDĢXåjejím sídlem je Moskva, Berlín, 
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%UXVHOQHERMDNpNROLMLQpPtVWRY]DKUDQLþt). This language invokes periods of historical 
occupation (under Nazi Germany and later the USSR) and relates EU membership to these times 
of oppression. This reflects the literature such as Rishøj’s work on the role that nationalism plays 
in Euroscepticism. As a newer party Úsvit supports the hypothesis that newer parties are most 
likely to be Eurosceptic. It is important to note that Úsvit and Svobodní were both founded by 
the same man, Tommio Okamura, and are both imprinted with his personal politics. This points 
to the importance of influential figures in determining party policy, as has also been 
demonstrated by Klaus’ influence on ODS.  
SPO 
In their 2015 party program express frustration with the ways in which globalization 
occurs in smaller states such as the Czech Republic in which they must be more concerned with 
alliances. Because of this SPO acknowledges the reasons why membership was initially 
appealing to the Czech Republic, but that there are now many problems within the EU. While 
SPO believes that EU (along with NATO) membership is important, they cannot be relied on 
entirely to solve the Czech Republic’s problems. SPO supports both hypotheses about newer and 
rural parties being more likely to be Eurosceptic. SPO also points to the influence of powerful 
personalities on a party’s political agenda, as it was founded by current Czech President Miloš 
Zeman (another fierce critic of the EU). While Zeman has longstanding ties with Czech 
government his previous party was the pro-(XURSHDQý66'WKXV632UHSUHVHQWVDVLJQLILFDQW
shift in terms of European policy.  
Summary 
 Through an analysis of party platforms it is evident that there is a relationship between 
age of party and that party’s likelihood of adopting Eurosceptic platforms. Not only are newer 
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parties more likely to be Eurosceptic, but also are more likely to adopt extreme Eurosceptic 
views and use extreme language in their voting programs. This is exemplified by ODS’ assertion 
that they are realists, as opposed to Úsvit and Svobodní’s harsher words about the EU’s 
democratic deficit. These platforms, however, do not indicate a strong relationship between less 
educated or rural party members and likelihood of Eurosceptic platforms.  
 
Interview Data: 
The following is a summary of interviews conducted with members of Úsvit, KDU-ý6/723
09, and SZ. As it pertains to the three major hypotheses of this study, these parties make up a 
representative sample of parties across the spectrum as Úsvit is far-right, TOP 09 and KDU-ý6/ 
are center-right, and SZ is center-left. Furthermore this set represents samples of both old (SZ 
and KDU-ý6/) and newer parties (Úsvit and TOP 09). These parties furthermore represent both 
parties with rural (KDU-ý6/) and urban (TOP 09, Úsvit and SZ) constituencies. There was also 
representation from parties with less educated (KDU-ý6/) and highly educated (TOP 09 and 
SZ) bases.  
Participants were asked a series of questions concerning their party’s relationship with 
the EU, with other parties, and with their constituents. Some of the questions asked include: 
Party Make-up  
1. What are the basic platforms of your party? Can you summarize what your party stands 
for in general?  
2. Where do you place your party on the political spectrum? What is your relationship with 
other parties? 
3. What is the demographic make-up of your party? Why are people drawn to your party?  
4. What issues are your party’s members most concerned with?  
5. What role do your constituents have in shaping party policy? Do they contribute to your 
party manifesto?  
 
EU Specific  
1. Has your party’s stance towards the EU changed? 
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2. How do you talk about European issues with your constituents? Are there any slogans, or 
language that you use with constituents when talking about Europe?  
3. How active are your constituents around EU issues? Does this shape your platforms?  
4. Has voters’ level of interest in the EU changed over time? 
5. In general, how well informed are your members about the EU? Where do your members 
typically get their information on the EU from?  
 
Euroscepticism 
6. How do you define Euroscepticism?  
7. Where does Euroscepticism come from (the people, elites, etc)? 
8. What kinds of people are more likely to identify as Eurosceptic?  
9. What opinion do you think most Czechs have of the EU? How does your party appeal to 
these opinions?  
10. Where do you think the future of the Czech Republic’s relationship with the EU lies? 
How do you think the Brexit will affect the Czech Republic’s relationship with the EU? 
How has it changed voters’ views of the EU?  
11. How do you think EU membership shapes domestic politics?  
12. Do you consider your party to be Eurosceptic? What do Eurosceptic parties usually 
stand for?  
 
Demographics: 
Education: 
Of the parties interviewed, only KDU-ý6/ discussed how they communicated with less 
educated members. Although they do not make up the entirety of KDU-ý6/¶VEDVHthe worker’s 
comments provides interesting insight into the fears of less educated, Eurosceptic voters.  The 
member from KDU-ý6/ further elaborated that there are differences between their less and 
more educated members on issues such as Syrian migration to the Czech Republic. He explained 
that less educated members are typically against accepting refugees, while more educated are 
open to it. This points to deeper cleavages within parties between elites and members. While 
KDU-ý6/PD\KDYHless educated members, their official party policy is pro-European. This 
disconnect between educated and less educated views on European issues within the same party 
reflects that age of the party being a more important factor in determining likelihood of 
Euroscepticism. Furthermore although there are less educated party members, they are not 
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typically creating party policy. It was difficult to find reliable data for the education levels of 
every party; this is especially true for the newer far-right parties as well as for the Piráti. This 
may be due to a lack of reliable information available due to the parties’ relative newness.  
Rural/Urban Divide: 
Out of the parties interviewed, the rural urban divide also does not have a strong impact 
on the party’s likelihood to adopt a Eurosceptic platform. The most rural party interviewed- 
KDU-ý6/ has an officially Euro-optimist stance. While this does not mean that every member 
shares in this view, at least officially, the rural base has not affected the party’s platforms. When 
interviewed, the worker from KDU-ý6/, said that at local party meetings they often have to 
assuage members’ fears about increasing integration (especially as it pertains for EU quotas for 
accepting refugees). The lack of a rural/urban divide along party lines does not necessarily mean 
that there are not differences between rural and urban voters in the Czech Republic. Rural/ urban 
divides are not necessarily reflected in a party’s stance, however, rural voters within a party are 
more likely to be opposed to the European Union. This suggests that voters are perhaps attracted 
to a pro-European, rural-based party (such as KDU-ý6/for other reasons other than that party’s 
position on the EU. The could perhaps also suggest that rural-based parties are not serving their 
constituents well in this area, a possible opening for a more Eurosceptic rural party to enter the 
scene. . Like many national parties KDU-ý6/ is headquartered in Prague, and as such those who 
wield the most power are not themselves rural party members. 
Other Demographic Information: 
The representative from SZ emphasized the number of female members and that most of 
their members join the party because of environmental issues. TOP 09 emphasized that people 
most often join parties because of local issues, rather than national or international, this could 
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help explain gaps between elite views and member views. Furthermore people join parties 
because of personal relationships with existing member. This also serves as a reminder that 
people join parties for reasons beyond that party’s stance on the EU, which may help explain 
why hypotheses do not always line up with realities of rural/urban divide, education, etc.  
Age of Party: 
 
One of the central hypotheses was that newer parties were more likely to adopt 
Eurosceptic platforms as a means by which to gain attention in the political landscape. From 
asking party-workers about their perceptions and working relationships with other parties, it is 
seen that five of the six parties founded in the last ten years are Eurosceptic. This is consistent 
with findings in the table and platforms found on party websites.  While Euroscepticism is a 
device used by parties in order to gain attention, this is not a device used only by new parties. 
Furthermore not all new parties adopted Eurosceptic platforms. TOP 09, a party that has existed 
since 2009, is pro-European. Other newer parties, such as Úsvit, are firmly Eurosceptic, 
however, the Communist Party has longstanding ties to Euroscepticism. Although the 
Communist Party represents a departure from the norm, as well as Klaus’ slightly Eurosceptic 
ODS, the finding that five of the six parties that were found to be either slightly or firmly 
Eurosceptic were founded within the last twenty-six years is significant. It is especially 
interesting in light of the fact that five out of the six of these parties were founded after the 
Czech Republic entered the European Union; this demonstrates a growth of Euroscepticism in 
party life.  
Five out of the six parties that were founded in the last ten years have at least a somewhat 
Eurosceptic platform. This supports the central hypothesis that newer parties are more likely to 
be Eurosceptic. Of those new parties that are not Eurosceptic, TOP 09 formed out of KDU-ý6/
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Therefore, while TOP 09 is a newer party, it has roots in a more established political party, 
which may help explain why it is not Eurosceptic. This finding is particularly important in light 
of the fact that the Czech Republic has low party stability.  Thus we may see a growth in not 
only Euroscepticism among Czech citizens, but also an increase in the number of Eurosceptic 
parties participating in coming elections.  
Communication Between Public and Elites 
Because of the discrepancies between official party policy and that which members 
believe, party members were asked how they communicate with party members about their 
policies and what influence members had in shaping policy. Most parties hold some form of 
local meetings where leaders explain policy and members can propose new ideas. Furthermore 
most parties develop policy through expert groups. A TOP 09 worker said, however, that these 
old-fashioned structures of holding these community meetings are not effective now because 
members now have direct access to party elites.  It is now more difficult to mobilize constituents 
to attend these meetings and have productive conversations, as they now can contact 
representatives from home. They elaborated that because of this, the party is now more open 
with members than in the past.  
The worker from KDU-ý6/ said that the EU has not typically been a major topic for 
members in these meetings. Recently, however, constituents have been concerned with the EU as 
it pertains to the refugee crisis. The KDU-ý6/ member also admitted that their party did not do a 
good job of explaining what the EU actually does with their members. A member from the Green 
Party asserted that politicians actually love the EU because the Czech Republic still gets more 
money from it than they give in, if this is true, then this illustrates a gap that exists between elites 
and members. As these answers come from Euro-optomist parties, it is most interesting how 
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KDU-ý6/is communicating due to the acknowledgement of their constituents’ unease around 
European issues.  
Public Knowledge 
Parties across the spectrum lamented the lack of public knowledge about both European 
issues and the role of the EU itself. The representative from TOP 09 explained that this problem 
could stem from the fact that there is no civic education in schools that teach students about the 
functions of the EU. Once students leave school, these low levels of knowledge can lead to 
greater susceptibility to believing misinformation about the EU. The representative from TOP 09 
said that implementing this type of education could be a problem because this type of education 
was abused during the communist period. Only the representative from SZ said that his party’s 
members were well informed, this demonstrates across the spectrum how party-workers do not 
have faith in the levels of education of their constituents on European issues, however, little is 
being done to combat this. This issue was mentioned at TOP 09, a party with more educated 
members; this lack of education seems to be an issue across the political spectrum as it occurs in 
public schools. As such, it does not appear that lack of institutionalized education about the EU 
has a direct effect on an individual’s likelihood to be Eurosceptic, however, there may be a 
connection between how far one continues in one’s education and their desire to learn more 
about the function of the government (including the EU).  
What is Euroscepticism? 
When asked to define Euroscepticism, party representatives were hesitant. As 
oversimplification of issues is a problem that pro-European parties have with the Eurosceptic 
camp, it makes sense that they would not want to reduce the issue of Euroscepticism down to a 
sound bite. Those interviewed expressed that there are many different kinds of Euroscepticism 
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and that it has existed in the Czech Republic since before the referendum for EU membership 
(mostly bolstered by the Communist Party and ODS leader Klaus). The representative from 
KDU-ý6/DVVHUWHGWKDW(XURVFHSWLFLVPLVIHDUWDFWLFVFRQQHFWHGZLWKPLVLQIRUPDWLRQ 
The representative from KDU-ý6/DOVRH[SUHVVHGWKDWWKH(XURVFHSWLFVPD\KDYHD
louder voice than their actual representation due to their active online presence. SZ asserted that 
a lot of the Euroscepticism comes from unrealistic expectations upon entering the EU; Czechs 
thought that joining the EU would solve all of their problems and when it did not they began to 
question membership. The biggest problem with Euroscepticism according to SZ was that 
Eurosceptics fail to challenge their own ideas, however, this representative was the most willing 
of the pro-European parties that I spoke to talking with Eurosceptics and trying to understand 
why they believe what they believe. Lack of desire on the part of the parties to label 
Euroscepticism demonstrates the difficulty in defining it. While Euroscepticism is generally 
considered to be critical view of the EU, the parties interviewed did not seem to want to define 
the term. On the Eurosceptic side, however, Úsvit say that half of their members want to leave 
immediately and half are waiting to see what the EU will do about the Syrian migration crisis.  
Is Euroscepticism realistic? 
Euro-optimist parties see Euroscepticism as an encumbrance to dealing with the issues 
that are facing the Czech Republic. While Euroscepticism is critical of the EU, according to pro-
European parties, they rarely provide substantive critiques of how they would like to change the 
EU. The representative from SZ elaborated on this, saying that Eurosceptics do not say what they 
want back from the EU; this leads him to question whether or not Euroscepticism is a genuine 
outlook or just employed for political points. This statement supports the alternative hypothesis 
that political parties are intentionally using Eurosceptic platforms to attract voters. Furthermore 
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there lack plans for what would happen if the Czech Republic were to leave the EU. 
Euroscepticism, said the representative of TOP 09, seems to be a trend, but it remains to be seen 
if it will be able to provide solutions. They elaborated that four years ago nobody wanted to say 
they are Eurosceptic, preferring instead the term Euro-realist, but are now embracing the label. 
This fits with the hypothesis that newer political parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic; 
beyond this they are willing to embrace the label. Newer parties are shown not only to be more 
likely to be Eurosceptic, but also more likely to embrace the term. Both Úsvit and Svobodní 
embrace the term, whereas more established Eurosceptic parties like ODS favor terminology 
such as Euro-realist. As new parties are established, they are doing so in a time where there are 
not the same stigmas on the label that there was during the time of accession. Indeed the label 
‘Eurosceptic,’ for some, may have positive connotations of a party that will fight government 
corruption.  
The worker from TOP 09 elaborated that it is difficult now to find Euro-optimist party 
because being a Euro-optimist is like telling people not to vote for you. This statement underlines 
the widespread public Euroscepticism, it also demonstrated the likelihood that new parties will 
continue to adopt Eurosceptic stances, as they are appealing in light of current political trends. It 
also provides evidence for the alternative hypothesis that political parties are fanning Eurosceptic 
fears in order to get votes.  
Summary 
 These interviews provide a more nuanced picture of the language presented through the 
previous section analyzing party platforms. Especially in terms of education and rural/urban 
divide, these interviews reveal that there are often differences between less educated and rural 
party members and that party’s official stance. This demonstrates that although rural and less 
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educated constituents may hold Eurosceptic views, this is not always reflected in party 
membership. By asking party members about other demographic features, what their ‘typical’ 
member looks, serves as a reminder that there are many reasons why an individual chooses to 
join a party. These cleavages may be realted to lack of effective communication between elites 
and members, as well as an overall lack of public education on the EU. These differences 
between level of education and party’s likelihood of Euroscepticism may also be due to the fact 
that the most reliable data has come from older parties. Older parties are likelier to have more 
loyal members. This is especially true with a party such as KDU-ý6/, which has such 
longstanding ties within the Czech system. Indeed, as Vlachova’s study suggest that KDU-ý6/
is one of the few Czech parties with stronger ties, it would make sense that members have 
stronger party loyalty beyond that party’s position on the EU.  
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Table 2 
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Other Materials: 
David Povolný at Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic created the proceeding 
chart. The chart discusses the eight most successful parties in Brno (the Czech Republic’s second 
largest city) in the 2014 election. Apart from Žít Brno, which is a local party, all other parties 
listed on the chart are included in this study, and as such it provides an important local example 
RIWKHVXFFHVVHVRIVHYHQRIWKHSDUWLHVLQFOXGHGLQWKLVSURMHFW$QRý66'.'8-ý6/2'6
6=.6ý0DQG723Žít Brno should not be completely ignored, however, as it garnered 
11.6% of the vote in Brno in 2014 (the third most successful party). This begs the questions as to 
if the three central hypotheses of these study- whether new parties, rural parties, and less 
educated parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic- are applicable also to regional parties as well.  
AFFRUGLQJWRWKLVFKDUWWKHW\SLFDOPHPEHURI$QRý66'DQG.6ý0KDYHDKLJKVFKRRO
education (VWĜHGRãNROVNpY]GČOiQt). The chart differentiates, however, between $QRý66'DV
having been high school with graduation (s maturitouZKHUHDV.6ý0GRHVQRWKDYe that 
VWLSXODWLRQ2IWKHVHWKUHHSDUWLHVRQO\.6ý0KDV(XURVFHSWLFSODWIRUPVKRZHYHULWLV
VLJQLILFDQWWKDWRIWKHSDUWLHVOLVWHG.6ý0KDVWKHORZHVWOHYHORIHGXFDWLRQDQGDUHNQRZQDVWKH
party with the longest standing ties to Euroscepticism (having been opposed to the 2004 
referendum for membership). Typical voters from KDU-ý6/2'66=DQG723DUHDOO
listed as having college education (Y\VRNRãNROVNpY]GČOiQt). Of those parties only ODS has any 
ties with Euroscepticism.  
Of note, this chart also discusses how typical voters from each of the parties listed in the 
last election. This speaks to the low party identification in the Czech Republic, the fact that 
voters move between parties from election to election. In the last election Ano voters were most 
OLNHO\WRYRWH$QRý66'RU723.'8-ý6/YRWHUVZHUHSUHYLRXVO\OLNHO\WRKDYHYRWHG
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KDU-ý6/723RU$QR2'6ZHUHPRVWOLNHO\WRKDYHYRWHG2'6RU7236=JUHHQ
party) voters were previously likely to have voted SZ, TOP 09, ODS, or KDU-ý6/Žít Brno 
(the local Brno party) voters were likely to have previously voted SZ, TOP 09, or for a smaller 
SDUW\2IWKHSDUWLHVOLVWHGRQO\ý66'DQG723KDYHWKHLUFXUUHQWYRWHUVKDYLQJYRWHG
exclusively for their own party in the previous election as well. This speaks to the flexibility of 
voters. 
Also speaking to the lack of longstanding ties to whom they will vote for, the chart 
discusses when voters made their electoral decisions. Ano and SZ are described as having 
decided whom they were voting for in the last two weeks (rozhodl se v posledních dvou 
týdnechý66'.'8-ý6/2'6DQG.6ý0YRWHUVKDYHNQRZQIRUDZKLOHKRZWKH\ZRXOG
vote (GORXKRGREČUR]KRGQXWêNRKREXGHYROLW). There is no data available on the chart 
concerning when TOP 09 voters decided how the\ZRXOGYRWH$Vý66'.'8-ý6/ ODS, and 
.6ý0DUHWKHROGHVWSDUWLHVLQWKH&]HFK5HSXEOLFLWLVQRWVXUSULVLQJWKDWWKHLUYRWHUVZRXOG
have decided whom they were voting for more in advance. Indeed this confirms Vlachova’s 
study which fouQGWKDWý66'.'8-ý6/2'6DQG.6ý0KDGORQJHUVWDQGLQJWLHVLQWKH
Czech political system, and therefore voters had stronger associations with them than with other 
parties.  
Summary 
 The longstanding decisions of voters from parties such as ý66'KDU-ý6/2'6DQG
.6ý0 help to explain why there may be a difference between party member’s personal views 
on the EU and that party’s official platform. Although SZ is not a newer party, as per Vlachova’s 
study, they are not one of the parties with longstanding ties in the Czech system. Furthermore the 
flexibility of voters to change from party to party between elections, demonstrates the ease with 
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which new parties may enter electoral competition. If many people are choosing a different party 
every election, then there is a greater opportunity for newer parties than in a system in which 
more parties had longstanding ties. If newer parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic, this may 
mean that there will be more room for Eurosceptic voting in future elections. 
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Map 1 
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Case Study: 2013 Presidential Election  
The 2013 presidential election between Miloš Zeman and Karel Schwarzenberg provides 
an important case study for contextualizing the rural/urban divide in the Czech Republic. The 
areas on the above map in blue include Prague, Brno, 3O]HĖ, and Ostrava, which are four of the 
five largest cities in the Czech Republic. Suburban centerVRIýHVNp%XGČMRYLFH+UDGHF
Králové, and Liberec are also blue. Schwarzenberg’s blue urban centers and Zeman’s red 
countryside, demonstrate a clear distinction between rural and urban voting preferences. While 
on a party-by-party basis, membership was not necessarily an indicator of a party developing 
Eurosceptic platforms; the results from the 2013 presidential election demonstrate a clear 
difference between rural and urban populations. Zeman’s election also disputes the assertion 
made by Spanje and de Vreese that while people may be inclined towards Euroscepticism, they 
will still elect pro-European parties.  
The presidential race between Zeman and Schwarzenberg exemplifies the ability of 
personalities to quickly form new parties. Zeman’s SPO and Schwarzenberg’s TOP 09 were both 
formed in 2009. This is also seen in the party Ano, which was founded in 2013 by Andrej Babiš, 
the second richest person in the Czech Republic in 2009. Both far right Úsvit and Svobodní were 
formed by businessman Tomio Okamura. As more Eurosceptic figures gain traction in the 
political system, there could be new parties forming around Eurosceptic personalities. This 
demonstrates that new parties are both quickly formed and successful. As has been established 
by this study, with new parties being more likely to be Eurosceptic, there is a greater chance of 
seeing Eurosceptic parties successfully participating in future elections.  
Ultimately the 2013 presidential election in the Czech Republic exemplifies not only the 
infiltration of Euroscepticism into the highest levels of domestic politics in the Czech Republic, 
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but also a clear rural/ urban divide when it comes to voters. This divide may not necessarily be 
reflected in specific party platforms, but for rural voters there is a clear preference towards 
Euroscepticism.  
Summary 
 The 2013 Presidential Election provides an important example in understanding the 
rural/urban divide in the Czech Republic. This study hypothesized that parties with more rural 
memberships would be more likely to adopt Eurosceptic platforms was proven false, however, 
the results of this election demonstrate that there is a clear rural/urban divide in Czech voting. 
The results of the 2013 election follow an urban- pro-EU, rural-anti-EU model. Furthermore the 
competition of two newer parties in the election demonstrates why attention needs to be paid to 
newer parties, not only are they more likely to be Eurosceptic, but they have proven to be 
successful in elections.   
 
Conclusion 
 Through the interviews conducted, it became apparent that there is a gap between party 
workers’ understanding of the EU and that of their constituents. This gap between official party 
platforms and public opinion on the EU is reflective of what several parties lamented about the 
lack of communication between parties and people about the functions of the EU. Party workers 
explained that they often do not engage with constituents effectively in this because it is difficult 
to talk about the technical aspects of the EU, whereas sensational stories about ‘bad Brussels’ are 
easy to produce. Still this seems to be a contradiction in an age where parties have a greater 
ability to communicate directly with constituents through new technologies.  
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The most significant of the three hypotheses tested is the age of the party. As five of the 
six parties founded in the last ten years have adopted Eurosceptic platforms, newer parties are 
more likely to be Eurosceptic. This is important in light of the fact that new parties are incredibly 
successful, with the 2013 Presidential Election serving as an excellent example. Knowing that 
newer parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic and that they are attractive option for voters 
shows that we need to pay attention to this trend. Additionally, newer parties are not only more 
likely to be Eurosceptic, but to adopt more extreme Eurosceptic stance than older Eurosceptic 
parties. Of the seven Eurosceptic parties examined in the study four scored higher than eight on 
the ten-point scale of Euroscepticism (with six serving as the threshold for Euroscepticism). Of 
those four, three three are newer parties. Out of the five newer parties surveyed three have a 
score of eight or higher. As newer Eurosceptic parties become more established, more embedded 
in government, it would be expected that they would soften some of their more extreme 
Eurosceptic stances.  
A study of why new parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic is particularly important in 
the Czech Republic, as there is low party stability overall. At least for the near future we can 
expect this trend of newer Eurosceptic parties to continue. What this study does not explore, 
however, is party extinction. Party instability also means that parties die out faster, how this 
applies directly to Eurosceptic parties needs to be further explored.   
Level of education and rural-ness both have an effect on an individual’s likelihood of 
being Eurosceptic, however, party elites tend to overrule these opinions in the creation of party 
platforms.  While there is not always a strong link between rural voters’ Euroscepticism and the 
likelihood of a party with a rural base adopting a Eurosceptic platform, the case of the 2013 
Presidential Election demonstrates that there is a clear rural/urban divide in the Czech Republic. 
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This is especially important when considering the pro-European stances of Schwarzenberg and 
the Euroscepticism of Zeman.  
There is little to suggest that parties with less educated members are more likely to adopt 
Eurosceptic platforms, as parties with less educated members exist with similar frequency on 
both ends of the spectrum. The parties with the most reliable data for on the issue of education, 
however, were older parties. As has been explained these older parties are the ones with the most 
developed member loyalty, so this may help to explain possible differences between party 
member’s personal stance on the EU and that of their party. Lack of correlation between 
education and Euroscepticism in parties may also point to these gaps between members and 
workers. Those who are developing party platforms, while they may be influenced be 
constituents, are typically highly educated and working in large cities (usually Prague), thus 
there may be some inconsistencies due to the distance between party members and workers.  
This study has looked at factors beyond a party’s position on the left-right spectrum in 
order to provide a fuller picture of which features Eurosceptic parties share. In doing this it is 
seen that in the future particular attention needs to be paid to newer political parties, as they have 
a greater likelihood of being Eurosceptic and can quickly become competitive in elections. 
Education and rural memberships are not reliable indicators of Eurosceptic platforms. It is 
imperative to understand Euroscepticism, as it is a trend that has seen greater successes across 
Europe. In the United States, the election of President Donald Trump can be seen as an 
analogous trend, rejecting the existing power structures. These similarities must not be 
overlooked as in the aftermath of the American election, President Klaus praised then President-
elect Trump and expressed admiration for many of his policy aims. Thus it is critical that we 
52 
understand which kinds of parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic, as Eurosceptic actors are 
having greater influence on policy decisions.  
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Appendix 
Political Parties Key (parties listed in alphabetical order): 
ANO  $NFHQHVSRNRMHQêFKREþDQĤ  Action of Dissatisfied Citizens 
ý66'  ýHVNiVWUDQDVRFLiOQČGHPRNUDWLFNi Czech Social Democratic Party  
KDU-ý6/ .ĜHVĢDQVNiDGHPRNUDWLFNiXQLH –  ýHVNRVORYHQVNiVWUDQDOLGRYi 
Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party 
.6ý0 .RPXQLVWLFNiVWUDQDýHFKD0RUDY\  Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia 
ODS  2EþDQVNi demokratická strana Civic Democratic Party 
Piráti  ýHVNiSLUiWVNiVWUDQD   Czech Pirate’s Party   
SPO  6WUDQD3UiY2EþDQĤ   Party of Civic Rights  
Svobodní 6WUDQDVYRERGQêFKREþDQĤ  Party of Free Citizens  
SZ  Strana zelených   Green Party 
TOP 09 Tradice 2GSRYČGQRVW3URVSHULWD Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity 09 
Úsvit  Úsvit - Národní koalice  Dawn- National Coalition  
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